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Abstract
The anthropic principle has been proposed as an explanation for the observed value of the
cosmological constant. Here we revisit this proposal by allowing for variation between universes
in the amplitude of the scale-invariant primordial cosmological density perturbations. We derive
a priori probability distributions for this amplitude from toy inflationary models in which the
parameter of the inflaton potential is smoothly distributed over possible universes. We find that
for such probability distributions, the likelihood that we live in a typical, anthropically-allowed
universe is generally quite small.
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The Anthropic Principle has been proposed as a possible solution to the two cosmological
constant problems: why the cosmological constant Λ is orders of magnitude smaller than
any theoretical expectation, and why it is non-zero and comparable today to the energy
density in other forms of matter [1, 2, 3]. This anthropic argument, which predates direct
cosmological evidence of the dark energy, is the only theoretical prediction for a small, non-
zero Λ [3, 4]. It is based on the observation that the existence of life capable of measuring
Λ requires a universe with cosmological structures such as galaxies or clusters of stars. A
universe with too large a cosmological constant either doesn’t develop any structure, since
perturbations that could lead to clustering have not gone non-linear before the universe
becomes dominated by Λ, or else has a very low probability of exhibiting structure-forming
perturbations, because such perturbations would have to be so large that they would lie
in the far tail-end of the cosmic variance. The existence of the string theory landscape,
in which causally disconnected regions can have different cosmological and particle physics
properties, adds support to the notion of an anthropic rule for selecting a vacuum.
How well does this principle explain the observed value of Λ in our universe? Careful
analysis by [4] finds that 5% to 12% of universes would have a cosmological constant smaller
than our own. In everyday experience we encounter events at this level of confidence,1 so as
an explanation this is not unreasonable.
If the value of Λ is not fixed a priori, then one might expect other fundamental parameters
to vary between universes as well. This is the case if one sums over wormhole configurations
in the path integral for quantum gravity [5], as well as in the string theory landscape [6, 7,
8, 9]. In [9] it was emphasized that all the parameters of the low energy theory would vary
over the space of vacua (“the landscape”). Douglas [7] has initiated a program to quantify
the statistical properties of these vacua, with additional contributions by others [8].
In [10], Aguirre stressed that life might be possible in universes for which some of the
cosmological parameters are orders of magnitude different from those of our own universe.
The point is that large changes in one parameter can be compensated by changes in another
in such a way that life remains possible. Anthropic predictions for a particular parameter
value will therefore be weakened if other parameters are allowed to vary between universes.
One cosmological parameter that may significantly affect the anthropic argument is Q, the
1 For instance, drawing two pairs in a poker hand.
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standard deviation of the amplitude of primordial cosmological density perturbations. Rees
[11] and Tegmark and Rees [12] have pointed out that if the anthropic argument is applied to
universes where Q is not fixed but randomly distributed, then our own universe becomes less
likely because universes with both Λ and Q larger than our own are anthropically allowed.
The purpose of this letter is to quantify this expectation within a broad class of inflationary
models. Restrictions on the a prori probability distribution for Q necessary for obtaining a
successful anthropic prediction for Λ, were considered in [13, 14].
In our analysis we let both Λ and Q vary between universes and then quantify the
anthropic likelihood of a positive cosmological constant less than or equal to that observed
in our own universe. We offer a class of toy inflationary models that allow us to restrict the
a priori probability distribution for Q, making only modest assumptions about the behavior
of the a priori distribution for the parameter of the inflaton potential in the anthropically-
allowed range. Cosmological and particle physics parameters other than Λ and Q are held
fixed as initial conditions at recombination. We provisionally adopt Tegmark and Rees’s
anthropic bound on Q: a factor of 10 above and below the value measured in our universe.
Even though this interval is small, we find that the likelihood that our universe has a typical
cosmological constant is drastically reduced. The likelihood tends to decrease further if
larger intervals are considered.
Weinberg determined in [3] that, in order for an overdense region to go nonlinear before
the energy density of the universe becomes dominated by Λ, the value of the overdensity
δ ≡ δρ/ρ must satisfy
δ >
(
729Λ
500ρ¯
)1/3
. (1)
In a matter-dominated universe this relation has no explicit time dependence. Here ρ¯ is
the energy density in non-relativistic matter. Perturbations not satisfying the bound cease
to grow once the universe becomes dominated by the cosmological constant. For a fixed
amplitude of perturbations, this observation provides an upper bound on the cosmological
constant compatible with the formation of structure. Throughout our analysis we assume
that at recombination Λ≪ ρ¯.
To quantify whether our universe is a typical, anthropically-allowed universe, additional
assumptions about the distribution of cosmological parameters and the spectrum of density
perturbations across the ensemble of universes are needed.
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A given slow-roll inflationary model with reheating leads to a Friedman-Roberston-Walker
universe with a (late-time) cosmological constant Λ and a spectrum of perturbations that is
approximately scale-invariant and Gaussian with a variance
Q2 ≡ 〈δ˜2〉HC . (2)
The expectation value is computed using the ground state in the inflationary era and per-
turbations are evaluated at horizon-crossing. The variance is fixed by the parameters of
the inflationary model together with some initial conditions. Typically, for single-field φ
slow-roll inflationary models,
Q2 ∼ H
4
φ˙2
∣∣∣∣∣
HC
. (3)
This leads to spatially separated over- or underdense regions with an amplitude δ that for
a scale-invariant spectrum are distributed (at recombination) according to
N (σ, δ) =
√
2
pi
1
σ
e−δ
2/2σ2 . (4)
(The linear relation between Q and the filtered σ in Eq. (4) is discussed below.)
By Bayes’s theorem, the probability for an anthropically-allowed universe (i.e. the proba-
bility that the cosmological parameters should take certain values, given that life has evolved
to measure them) is proportional to the product of the a priori probability distribution P
for the cosmological parameters, times the probability that intelligent life would evolve given
that choice of parameter values. Following [4], we estimate that second factor as being pro-
portional to the mean fraction F(σ,Λ) of matter that collapses into galaxies. The latter is
obtained in a universe with cosmological parameters Λ and σ by spatially averaging over all
over- or underdense regions, so that [4]
F(σ,Λ) =
∫ ∞
δmin
dδ N(σ, δ)F(δ,Λ) . (5)
The lower limit of integration is provided by the anthropic bound of Eq. (1), which gives
δmin ≡ (729Λ/500ρ¯)1/3. The anthropic probability distribution is
P(σ,Λ) = P (Λ, σ)F(σ,Λ)dΛ dσ . (6)
Computing the mean fraction of matter collapsed into structures requires a model for the
growth and collapse of inhomogeneities. The Gunn-Gott model [15, 16] describes the growth
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and collapse of an overdense spherical region surrounded by a compensating underdense
shell. The weighting function F(δ,Λ) gives the fraction of mass in the inhomogeneous
region of density contrast δ that eventually collapses (and then forms galaxies). To a good
approximation it is given by [4]
F(δ,Λ) = δ 1
δ + δmin
. (7)
Additional model-dependence occurs in the introduction of the parameter s given by the
ratio of the volume of overdense sphere to the volume of the under-dense shell surrounding
the sphere. We will set s = 1 throughout.
Since the anthropically allowed values for Λ are so much smaller than any other mass scale
in particle physics, and since we assume that Λ = 0 is not a special point in the landscape,
we follow [4, 17] in using the approximation P (Λ) ≃ P (Λ = 0) for Λ within the anthropically
allowed window.2 The requirement that the universe not recollapse before intelligent life has
had time to evolve anthropically rules out large negative Λ [2, 19]. We will assume that the
anthropic cutoff for negative Λ is close enough to Λ = 0 that all Λ < 0 may be ignored in
our calculations.
As an example of a concrete model for the variation in Q between universes, we consider
inflaton potentials of the form (see, for example, [20])
V = Λ + λφ2p , (8)
where p is a positive integer.3 We assume there are additional couplings that provide an
efficient reheating mechanism, but are unimportant for the evolution of φ during the infla-
tionary epoch. The standard deviation of the amplitude of perturbations gives
Q = A
√
λ
φp+1
HC
M3
Pl
, (9)
where A is a constant, and φHC is the value of the field when the mode of wave number
k leaves the horizon. This φHC has logarithmic dependence on λ and k, which we neglect.
Randomness in the initial value for φ affects only those modes that are (exponentially) well
2 Garriga and Vilenkin point to examples of quintessence models in which the approximation
P (Λ) ≃ P (Λ = 0) in the anthropically-allowed range is not valid [18].
3 Recent analysis of astronomical data disfavors the λφ4 inflationary model [21], but for generality we will
consider an arbitrary p in Eq. (8).
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outside our horizon. Throughout this letter, we will set the spectral index to one and ignore
its running. Equation (9) then gives λ ∝ Q2.
Next, suppose that the fundamental parameters of the Lagrangrian are not fixed, but
vary between universes, as might be expected if one sums over wormhole configurations in
the path integral for quantum gravity [5] or in the string theory landscape [6, 7, 8, 9]. To
obtain the correct normalization for the density perturbations observed in our universe, the
self-coupling must be extremely small. As the standard deviation Q will be allowed to vary
by an order of magnitude around 10−5, for this model the self-coupling in alternate universes
will be very small as well.
We may then perform an expansion about λ = 0 for the a priori probability distribution of
λ. The smallness of λ suggests that we may keep only the leading term in that expansion. If
the a priori probability distribution extends to negative values of λ (which are anthropically
excluded due to the instability of the resulting action for φ), we expect it to be smooth near
λ = 0, and the leading term in the power series expansion to be zeroth order in λ (i.e., a
constant). Therefore we expect a flat a priori probability distribution for λ. The a priori
probability distribution for Q is then
P (Q) ∝ dλ
dQ
∼ Q , (10)
where the normalization constant is determined by the range of integration in Q. Note that
this distribution favors large Q. On the other hand, if the a priori probability distribution
for the coupling λ only has support for λ > 0 then λ = 0 is a special point and we cannot
argue that P (Q) ∝ Q. However, since the anthropically-allowed values of λ are very small,
the a priori distribution for λ should be dominated, in the anthropically-allowed window,
by a leading term such as P (λ) ∼ λq. Normalizability requires q > −1. Using λ ∝ Q2, this
gives P (Q) ∼ Q2q+1.
Before proceeding, it is convenient to transform to the new variables:
y ≡ Λ
ρ∗
; σˆ ≡ σ
(
ρ¯
ρ∗
) 1
3
. (11)
Here ρ¯ is the energy-density in non-relativistic matter at recombination, which we take to be
fixed in all universes, and ρ∗ is the value for the present-day energy density of non-relativistic
matter in our own universe. For a matter-dominated universe σˆ is time-independent, whereas
y is constant for any era. Here and throughout this letter, a subscript ∗ denotes the value
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that is observed in our universe for the corresponding quantity. The only quantities whose
variation from universe to universe we will consider are y and σˆ.
In terms of these variables and following [4], the probability distribution of Eq. (6) is
found to be
P = Ndσˆdy P (σˆ)
∫ ∞
β
dx
e−x
β1/2 + x1/2
, (12)
where
β ≡ 1
2σˆ2
(
729y
500
)2/3
, (13)
and N is the normalization constant.
Notice that, since x ≥ β, large β implies that P ∼ e−β ≪ 1. For a fixed σˆ, large y
implies large β. Thus, for fixed σˆ, large cosmological constants are anthropically disfavored.
But if σˆ is allowed to increase, then β ∼ O(1) may be maintained at larger y. Garriga
and Vilenkin have pointed out that the distribution in Eq. (12) may be rewritten using
the change of variables (σˆ, y) 7→ (σˆ, β) [14]. The Jacobian for that transformation is a
function only of σˆ. Equation (12) then factorizes into two parts: one depending only on
σˆ, the other only on β. Integration over σˆ produces an overall multiplicative factor that
cancels out after normalization, so that any choice of P (σˆ) will give the same distribution
for the dimensionless parameter β. In that sense, even in a scenario where σˆ is randomly
distributed, the computation in [4] may be seen as an anthropic prediction for β.4 The
measured value of β is, indeed, typical of anthropically-allowed universes, but an anthropic
explanation for β alone does not address the problem of why both Λ and Q should be so
small in our universe.
Implementing the anthropic principle requires making an assumption about the minimum
mass of “stuff”, collapsed into stars, galaxies, or clusters of galaxies, that is needed for the
formation of life. It is more convenient to express the minimum mass Mmin in terms of
a comoving scale R: Mmin = 4piρ¯a
3
eqR
3/3 (by convention a = 1 today, so R is a physical
scale). We do not know the precise value of R. A better understanding of biology would
in principle determine its value, which should only depend on chemistry, the fraction of
matter in the form of baryons, and Newton’s constant. In our analysis these are all fixed
initial conditions at recombination. In particular, we would not expect Mmin to depend on
4 We thank Garriga and Vilenkin for explaining this point to us.
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Λ or Q.5 Therefore, even though the relation between Mmin and R depends on present-
day cosmological parameters, the value of this threshold will be constant between universes
because it depends only on parameters that we are treating as fixed initial conditions. Thus,
in computing the probability distribution over universes, we will fix R. Since we don’t know
what is the correct anthropic value for R, we will present our results for both R=1 and 2
Mpc. (R on the order of a few Mpc corresponds to requiring that structures as large as our
galaxy be necessary for life.)
We then proceed to filter out perturbations with wavelength smaller than R, leading to
a variance σ2 that depends on the filtering scale. Expressed in terms of the power spectrum
evaluated at recombination,
σ2 =
1
2pi2
∫ ∞
0
dk k2P (k)W 2(kR) (14)
where W is the filter function, which we take to be a Gaussian W (x) = e−x
2/2. P (k) is the
power spectrum, which we assume to be scale-invariant. (For P (k) we use Eq. (39) of [4],
setting n = 1).
Evaluating (14) at recombination gives, for our universe,
σˆ∗ = C∗Q∗ . (15)
The number C∗ contains the growth factor and transfer function evaluated from horizon
crossing to recombination and only depends on physics from that era. We assume Λ is
small enough so that at recombination it can be ignored and thus we take the variation in
σˆ between universes to come solely from its explicit dependence on Q.
We may then use observations of Q∗ and σ∗ to determine σˆ = C∗Q, valid for all universes.
We use the explicit expression for C∗ that is obtained from Eqs. (39)-(43) and (48)-(51) in
Ref. [4]. This takes as inputs the Hubble parameter H0 ≡ 100h∗km/s, the energy density
in non-relativistic matter Ω∗, the cosmological constant λ∗ = 1 − Ω∗, the baryon fraction
Ωb = 0.023h
−2
∗ , the smoothing scale R, and the COBE normalized amplitude of fluctuations
at horizon crossing, Q∗ = 1.94× 10−5Ω−.785−0.05∗ln Ω∗∗ .
As we have argued, the dependence of C∗ on the cosmological constant is not relevant for
our purposes. For our calculations we use Ω∗ = 0.134h
−2
∗ , and h∗ = 0.73 (consistent with
5 Note, however, that requiring life to last for billions of years (long enough for it to develop intelligence
and the ability to do astronomy) might place bounds on Q. See [12].
8
their observed best-fit values [22]). The smoothing scale R will be taken to be either 1 Mpc
or 2 Mpc, and the corresponding values for C∗ are 5.2 · 104 and 3.8 · 104.
The values chosen for the range of Q are motivated by the discussion in [12] about
anthropic limits on the amplitude of the primordial density perturbations. The authors of
[12] argue that Q between 10−3 and 10−1 leads to the formation of numerous supermassive
blackholes which might obstruct the emergence of life.6 They then claim that universes with
Q less than 10−6 are less likely to form stars, or if star clusters do form, that they would
not be bound strongly enough to retain supernova remnants. Since there is considerable
uncertainty in these limits, we carry out calculations using both the range indicated by [12]
as well as a range that is somewhat broader.7
Previous work on applying the anthropic principle to variable Λ and Q has assumed
a priori distributions P (Q) that fall off as 1/Qk for large Q, with k ≥ 3 [13, 14]. Such
distributions were chosen in order to keep the anthropic probability P(y,Q) normalizable,
and they usually yield anthropic predictions for the cosmological constant similar to those
that were obtained in [4] by fixing Q to its observed value, because they naturally favor a Q
as small as its observed value in our universe. For instance, for P (Q) ∝ 1/Q3 in the range
Q∗/10 < Q < 10Q∗, P (y < y∗) = 5% for R = 1 Mpc, while P (y < y∗) = 7% for R = 2
Mpc.)
However, if we accept the argument of Tegmark and Rees in [12] that there are natural
anthropic cutoffs on Q, it follows that the behavior of P (Q) at large Q is irrelevant to the
normalizability of P(y,Q). Furthermore, P (Q) ∼ 1/Qk in the neighborhood of Q = 0 for
k ≥ 1 leads to an unnormalizable distribution, since the integral ∫ P (Q)dQ blows up. In
what follows we shall consider two a priori distributions: P (Q) ∝ Q, and P (Q) ∝ 1/Q0.9
inside the anthropic window, motivated by the inflationary models we have discussed.
The results are summarized in Table I, where P (y < y∗) is the anthropic probability that
the value y be no greater than what is observed in our own universe, 〈y〉 is the anthropically-
weighed mean value of y, and y5% is the value of y such that the anthropic probability of
6 They also note that for Q > 10−4 formation of life is possible, but planetary disruptions caused by flybys
may make it unlikely for planetary life to last billions of years.
7 Notice that we are using the ranges indicated in [12] as absolute anthropic cutoffs. Arguments like those
made in [12] introduce some correction to the approximation made in [4] that the probability of life is
proportional to the amount of matter that collapses into compact structures. Since we are largely ignorant
of what the form of this correction is, we have approximated it as a simple window function.
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P (Q) ∝ 1/Q0.9 in the range P (Q) ∝ Q in the range
Q∗/10 < Q < 10Q∗ Q∗/15 < Q < 15Q∗ Q∗/10 < Q < 10Q∗ Q∗/15 < Q < 15Q∗
R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc
P (y < y∗) 1 ·10−3 3 ·10−3 4·10−4 1 ·10−3 5 ·10−4 1 ·10−3 1 ·10−4 4 ·10−4
〈y〉/y∗ 1 ·104 4 ·103 4 ·104 1 ·104 1 ·104 5 ·103 4 ·104 2 ·104
y5%/y∗ 9 ·10 4 ·10 3·102 1 ·102 2 ·102 7·10 6·102 2 ·102
TABLE I: Anthropically Determined Properties of the Cosmological Constant
P (Q) ∝ 1/Q0.9 in the range P (Q) ∝ Q in the range
Q∗/10 < Q < 10Q∗ Q∗/15 < Q < 15Q∗ Q∗/10 < Q < 10Q∗ Q∗/15 < Q < 15Q∗
R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc R = 1 Mpc R = 2 Mpc
P (Q < Q∗) 8 ·10−4 8 ·10−4 2 ·10−4 2 ·10−4 1 ·10−5 1 ·10−5 1 ·10−6 1 ·10−6
〈Q〉/Q∗ 8 8 11 11 8 8 13 13
Q5%/Q∗ 4 4 6 6 5 5 8 8
TABLE II: Anthropically Determined Properties of the Amplitude for Density Pertubations
obtaining a value no greater than that is 5%.
By comparison, for this choice of cosmological parameters, the authors of [4] find that,
for Q fixed (or measured), the probability of a universe having a cosmological constant no
greater than our own is much higher: P (y < 0.7/0.3) = .05 and 0.1, for R = 1 Mpc and
R = 2 Mpc respectively.8
One can also ask what is the probability of observing a value for Q in the range Q∗/10 <
Q < Q∗, after averaging over all possible cosmological constants. Table II summarizes the
resulting distribution in Q.
In summary, inflation and a landscape of anthropically determined coupling constants
provides (in some scenarios) a conceptually clean framework for variation between universes
in the magnitude of Q. Since increasing Q allows the probability of structure to remain
non-negligible for Λ considerably larger than in our own universe, anthropic solutions to
the cosmological constant problem are weakened by allowing Q as well as Λ to vary from
one universe to another.
The authors thank J. Garriga and A. Vilenkin for valuable comments. This work was
8 These numbers are taken from Table 1 in the published version of Ref. [4].
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